






This classroom experiment uses a double oral auction credit market to
demonstrate how inﬂation uncertainty causes a wealth transfer between borrowers
and lenders.The experiment also shows the social cost of inﬂation uncertainty
when borrowers and lenders cannot agree on a nominal interest rate that
compensates each for their risk.In this case,the credit market fails to allocate funds
to the highest-valued investment projects.The experiment provides hands-on
experience with the effects of anticipated and unanticipated inﬂation,giving
students a common background for a discussion of the economic costs of inﬂation.
It can be used in principles,intermediate macroeconomics,money and banking,or
ﬁnancial economics courses,with 8–60 students.It takes approximately 50 minutes
to run and requires no computers.
The author gratefully acknowledges Jeffrey Parker’s help designing the inﬂation
uncertainty experiment,and the funding provided by a grant from Will and
Susanna Thomas and from the Sally Ann Abshire Research Scholar Award.She also
thanks Noelwah Netusil for her helpful suggestions.
Introduction
This paper describes how to run and debrief a classroom experiment that
demonstrates some of the economic costs of inﬂation uncertainty.In the
experiment,students take the roles of potential borrowers and lenders in a double
oral auction credit market.Borrowers have the opportunity to undertake
investment projects with relatively high real returns.However,they have no funds
of their own with which to ﬁnance their projects.Lenders do have funds.Lenders
also have the opportunity to undertake investment projects,but their projects have
relatively low real returns.Gains from trade reach their maximum when all of the
lenders agree to lend their funds to the borrowers,so that the highest-valued
projects get ﬁnanced.
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typically requires 45 to 50 minutes,depending on the class size and whether
students have previous experience with a double oral auction.Larger classes
require more time,mainly for the recording of loans on the board.In a class of 30 or
more students,the instructor will probably want to arrange for an assistant to help
record loans,so that the experiment can be completed in 50 minutes.
As background for the experiment,students need to know the Fisher equation.So,
in a class meeting before the experiment,the instructor explains that the real
interest rate is (approximately) the nominal interest rate minus the inﬂation rate.To
make sure students can work with this Fisher relationship,I suggest assigning the
homework problem in Table 1.
On the day of the experiment,the instructor clears space in the classroom to use as
the trading ﬂoor,and makes sure that students have enough room to move from
the trading ﬂoor to the blackboard to report their results.As students enter the
classroom,the instructor gives each a private information slip establishing that
person’s role in the experiment.The slip indicates the real interest rate on that
student’s project,and whether the student starts each period with funds of $100 or
$0.Before passing out the slips,the instructor asks students to keep their project’s
real return conﬁdential.Table 2 shows a sample private information slip for a
potential lender,someone who starts each period with $100.Table 3 shows a
sample private information slip for a potential borrower,someone who starts each
period with $0.For the purpose of recording the experimental results,each student
gets a unique experimental ID.To prevent confusion,lenders have ID letters and
borrowers have ID numbers.
See the Appendix for the experiment instructions.These instructions,as well as the
other materials for running the experiment in classes of 8–60,are available from the
author upon request.The instructor distributes the instructions and reads them
aloud,while inviting students to ask questions.The instructor also distributes the
student record-keeping sheet in Table 4,which describes the process for calculating
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Borrowers and lenders contract for loans in nominal terms.Their payoffs depend on
the real returns on their loans,which in turn depend on the inﬂation rate.In the ﬁrst
few periods,borrowers and lenders know what the inﬂation rate will be.In later
periods,they ﬁnd out the inﬂation rate after they contract for their loans.Over the
last few periods,the inﬂation rate becomes progressively more variable.This
variability makes the loans risky.For instance,unexpectedly low inﬂation beneﬁts
lenders,but harms borrowers.Unexpectedly high inﬂation has the opposite effects.
The experiment demonstrates these welfare effects.It also shows that if some
participants exhibit risk aversion,then inﬂation uncertainty can prevent the credit
market from operating effectively.That is,when a borrower and lender cannot
agree on a nominal interest rate that provides enough of a risk premium for each of
them,they do not arrange a loan.So,instead of lending their funds to those with
higher-valued projects,lenders ﬁnance their own lower-valued projects.The
foregone gains from trade constitute a social cost of inﬂation uncertainty.
Participating in this experiment gives students hands-on experience with some of
the costs of inﬂation described in the economics literature.For instance,Hess and
Morris (1996) describe how unexpected inﬂation leads to a transfer of wealth
between lenders and borrowers.In the experiment,students experience this wealth
transfer,making an otherwise abstract concept come alive.Briault (1995) observes
that the likely effects of inﬂation uncertainty include the increased attractiveness of
real (as opposed to nominal) assets as a hedge against inﬂation.In the experiment,
investment projects have real returns independent of the inﬂation rate.For someone
who has funds,undertaking his own project looks attractive compared to a nominal
loan that exposes the lender to the risk of high inﬂation.Borrowers,as they negotiate
with the lenders,see that increased inﬂation uncertainty makes it increasingly
harder to convince these people to lend their funds.What’s more,even as the
lenders ask for higher nominal interest rates as compensation for their risk,
borrowers want to pay lower rates to protect themselves against the risk of low
inﬂation.The experiment drives home the idea that it’s inﬂation uncertainty that
causes this impasse,not inﬂation itself.That is,in the periods when the inﬂation rate
is perfectly predictable,the credit market channels funds as if there were no inﬂation
at all.But as the inﬂation rate becomes more and more variable,the ﬂow of funds
starts drying up,so that the market no longer channels funds to their best use.
Running the experiment
I recommend running the experiment before discussing the costs of inﬂation.
The experiment thereby introduces the difference between anticipated and
unanticipated inﬂation and provides a common background for students who
often have little real-world experience with variable inﬂation.The experiment
Table 1:Homework assignment to prepare students for the experiment
Suppose Lisa lends to Brad at an annual nominal interest rate of 7%.
(a)  If both people expect the inﬂation rate to be 3% over the coming year,what real
interest rate do they expect on the loan?
(b) If the actual inﬂation rate turns out to be 1%,what real interest rate does Brad
actually pay on the loan?
(c)  Who is harmed and who is beneﬁted by inﬂation that is lower than anticipated?
Explain.A Classroom Inflation Uncertainty Experiment
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proﬁts and allows students to track their results.Note that proﬁts do not carry over
from one period to the next.For simplicity,each period is completely separate from
the last.
Once the instructor opens the trading period,borrowers and lenders will stand up
and mingle,using a double oral auction to arrange their loans.That is,lenders call
out offers to lend at nominal interest rates they specify.Similarly,borrowers call out
offers to borrow at nominal interest rates they specify.Any lender may accept any
borrower’s offer,and vice versa.All loans must be for exactly $100,and each project
can be undertaken at most once per period.After a borrower and lender arrange a
loan,they come to front of the room to report the nominal interest rate on their loan
and their experimental IDs.The instructor records this information on the board for
all to see.These students then take seats on the edge of the trading ﬂoor to indicate
that they have ﬁnished for that period.After everyone who wishes to has traded,the
instructor announces the end of the period.When the instructor begins the next
period,everyone will again start with the amount of funds indicated on their
information slip,and the opportunity to undertake their project.Regardless of the
inﬂation rate,the project will always have the real return shown on the slip.
For the ﬁrst two or three periods,the instructor announces before the period begins
that the inﬂation rate will be zero.Running these initial periods with zero inﬂation
establishes the equilibrium nominal (and real) interest rate in the absence of inﬂation.
Consider,for instance,Table 5,which shows project values for a class of 16.In the
periods when these participants know there will be no inﬂation,nominal interest
rates between 1.5% and 2.5% will make the quantity demanded of loans equal the
quantity supplied,at a quantity of eight.So,in equilibrium nominal (and real) interest
rates range between 1.5% and 2.5%,and all of the funds get lent.Those with funds
are willing to lend at rates in this range because they earn more from the loans than
Table 2:Sample private information slip for a lender
Your ID letter is A.
Your project provides a real interest rate of 1.5%.
You start each period with $100.
Table 3:Sample private information slip for a borrower
Your ID number is 1.
Your project provides a real interest rate of 2.5%.
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nominal interest rate’.Sometimes students realise they are confused only after they
start calculating their proﬁts at the end of this period.At this point,it helps if the
instructor demonstrates on the board how to calculate the real interest rate on one
of the loans made in this period.So,the instructor takes an actual loan (which
students reported in nominal terms) and demonstrates what that loan means in
real terms.For example,consider a loan with a nominal interest rate of 6.0%.It has a
real interest rate of 6.0% – 4.0% = 2.0%.Most students ﬁnd their confusion resolved
when they see this example,and they can ﬁnish calculating their proﬁts.However,
the instructor should circulate as students are recording their proﬁts,to provide
individual help to any who remain confused.In particular,a student who chooses
not to lend or borrow in this period is not maximising their proﬁt,a sign that person
needs more help understanding what’s going on.The instructor can discreetely
show this student an example of what their proﬁt would have been if they had
accepted one of the loan offers made that period.
Consider,for example,a potential borrower with a project that has a 4.5% real
return.The instructor could point out that:‘Borrowing at 6.0% would give you proﬁt
equal to the real return on your project minus the real interest rate on the loan:
4.5% – 2.0% = 2.5%.This 2.5% proﬁt is better than the zero you get if you don’t
borrow and therefore can’t take your project.’Similarly,consider a potential lender
with a project that has a 1.5% real return.The instructor could point out that:
‘Lending at 6.0% gives you more proﬁt than you get from taking your own project.
Lending gives you a 2.0% real return,whereas taking your own project gives you
only 1.5%.’It generally takes two periods for everyone to understand and the
market to reach equilibrium.
Note that if the class has an uneven number of students,then there will be an extra
lender or borrower.In this case there will always be one person not contracting
each period,even in equilibrium.1
The instructor introduces inﬂation uncertainty by announcing before the next
period begins that the inﬂation rate will be either 3%,4% or 5%,with equal
probability.After everyone has negotiated their loans,the instructor randomly
generates the inﬂation rate by asking a student to roll a die.The inﬂation rate for
that period is whichever number (3,4 or 5) comes up.On a 1,2 or 6,the student
would re-roll.Because students enjoy the casino-like tension during the roll,it helps
to use a fairly large die that most of the class can see.
In later periods the instructor introduces even greater inﬂation uncertainty:2%,3%,
4%,5% or 6%,with equal probability.If time permits the instructor can increase
inﬂation uncertainty even further,always maintaining the expected inﬂation rate of
4%.The rates could even include deﬂation.For example the inﬂation rate could be
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they would if they took their own projects.Those without funds are willing to borrow
at these rates because they ﬁnance projects that provide higher returns than they
pay on the loans.With all of the funds ﬂowing to those with the higher-valued
projects,the credit market achieves the maximum possible gains from trade.
It generally takes two or three periods for the market to reach equilibrium.Once all
(or most) of the interest rates have converged to the equilibrium range,the
instructor announces that,in the next period,the inﬂation rate will be 4% with
certainty.Now,nominal interest rates between 5.5% and 6.5% will make the
quantity demanded of loans equal the quantity supplied.So in equilibrium,real
interest rates still range between 1.5% and 2.5%,all eight loans get made,and the
credit market channels funds to the highest-valued projects.
In this period with perfectly anticipated inﬂation of 4%,most borrowers and
lenders will simply adjust their nominal interest rate bids and offers up by about
4%.However,some students may be confused about what to do.Before trade
begins,the instructor can help students understand what their nominal interest
rate offers will translate to in real terms by writing the Fisher approximation on the
board (r = i – π),ﬁlling in 4% for the inﬂation rate (r = i – 4%) and pointing out that
‘you know for sure that the real interest rate on a loan will be 4% less than the
Table 5:Lenders and borrowers:information for a class of 16









1 no funds 2.5
2 no funds 3.5
3 no funds 4.5
4 no funds 3.0
5 no funds 3.5
6 no funds 4.0
7 no funds 5.0
8 no funds 3.0A Classroom Inflation Uncertainty Experiment
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Before beginning the next period,the instructor transfers this student’s slip and
record-keeping sheet to a borrower who did not make a loss that period,effectively
promoting that person to the position of running multiple projects.
Results
Table 6 shows the results for an intermediate macroeconomics class of 16 students
who had the project values listed in Table 5.Three-quarters of the students in this
class had never before participated in a classroom experiment.The information on
loans appears as I recorded it on the board,with the borrower’s ID number listed
ﬁrst,then the lender’s ID letter,and the nominal interest rate.The IDs of those who
neither lent nor borrowed do not appear in the table.In this session,Periods 6–9
had variable inﬂation.For these periods,the actual inﬂation rate appears
underlined.I ran the job-loss variation in Periods 8 and 9.In Period 8,Borrowers 1
and 8 each incurred a loss,so I transferred responsibility for their projects to two
other students in Period 9.It took 45 minutes to run the experiment,including
reading the instructions.
In each of Periods 2–6,the credit markets operated efficiently,moving funds from
the eight lenders,with their lower-valued projects,to the eight borrowers,with
their higher-valued projects.Typically,in the ﬁrst period of a classroom experiment,
students are still ﬁguring out how things work.Being in that learning phase
probably explains why Borrower 4 and Lender E could not agree on a loan in Period
1,even though theory suggests they should.Any interest rate between 1.5% and
3.0% would have provided gains from trade for both of them.However,by Period 2,
all the interest rates had reached the equilibrium range,and everyone was
contracting for loans,just as theory predicts.I ran a third period with zero inﬂation,
to make sure all the students understood what they were doing,before moving on
to the phase of the experiment with positive and completely predictable inﬂation.
In Periods 4 and 5,all the interest rates again fell within the equilibrium range,and
everyone contracted for loans,as theory predicts.
In Period 6,the ﬁrst period with inﬂation uncertainty,everyone still contracted for
loans,although they did so at higher interest rates than in the previous period.
Because the inﬂation rate turned out to be 5% in Period 6,Lenders E and F,who
both lent at 5.9%,each received a real return of only 0.9%.If they had protected
themselves from inﬂation uncertainty by funding their own projects,E and F would
have achieved real returns of 1.5% and 1.0% respectively.Lenders A and D,who
both lent at 6.0%,also ended up worse off than they would have been if they had
taken their own projects.When inﬂation uncertainty increased in Period 7,Lenders
E and F opted to take their own projects rather than lending.All the other lenders,
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–1%,0%,1%,2%,3%,4%,5%,6%,7%,8%,or 9%,with equal probability.In this case,
the instructor can switch to a twelve-sided die,or draw from a deck of playing cards.
After the experiment ends,the instructor randomly selects one period to provide
payoffs.Knowing that only one period will provide payoffs prevents students from
viewing the multiple periods as an opportunity to diversify their risk.The instructor
distributes proﬁts in the form of one small individually-wrapped chocolate,for each
0.5% of proﬁt earned that period.To cover potential losses,the instructor stakes
each student three pieces of chocolate,as described in the instructions.
When the instructor introduces inﬂation uncertainty,risk-averse lenders will want
higher nominal interest rates,and risk-averse borrowers will want lower rates,as
compensation for their inﬂation risk.Those traders with a high degree of risk
aversion,or the traders with the least to gain from a loan (the borrower with the
2.5% and the lender with the 1.5% real return on the project) may not ﬁnd a
mutually acceptable nominal interest rate.The lenders would then opt to ﬁnance
their own projects,making overall gains from trade fall as their lower-valued
projects replace the borrowers’higher-valued projects.On the other hand,
undertaking a loan provides for positive expected proﬁts,which may overcome the
disadvantage of the risk.Moreover,many students like to gamble.They look
forward to the tension as the die rolls across the ﬂoor,on its way to determining the
inﬂation rate for that period.Finally,because the experiment has students gambling
with a small amount of chocolate proﬁts,they may exhibit more risk-loving
behavior than they would if they had a large percentage of their wealth at stake.So,
whether inﬂation uncertainty prevents the credit market from operating
efffectively depends on the participants and their attitudes toward risk.
Students often do display enough risk aversion for the results to show that
increasing inﬂation uncertainty reduces the credit market’s ability to channel funds
to their best use.However,sometimes even with highly variable inﬂation,none of
the students display the risk-averse behavior typical of a borrower or lender with a
lot at stake.In this case,the instructor can inspire that behavior by introducing a
variation towards the end of the experiment.The instructor announces before the
next period begins that participants have been making their lending or borrowing
decisions as part of their jobs.Their bosses have become concerned about the losses
that some of these people have incurred.So,anyone making a loss in the next period
will lose their job.The instructor explains that a person making a loss will have to sit
out for the rest of the experiment,and someone who did not make a loss that period
will take over their role.For instance,suppose the inﬂation rate turns out to be 2.0%.
Consider a borrower with a 3.5% real project return who borrowed at a nominal
interest rate of 6.5%.They paid a real interest rate of 4.5%,and made a loss of 1.0%.A Classroom Inflation Uncertainty Experiment
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Discussion
The next day in class,we spent 15 minutes on a follow-up discussion.To start the
discussion,I asked the lenders to tell us the real returns on their projects.Then I
asked the borrowers to do the same.The class noted that all of the borrowers had
higher project returns than the lenders.We next observed that in the periods when
the inﬂation rate was perfectly predictable,the credit market channelled all the
funds to the highest-valued projects.Students remarked that as long as they could
anticipate the inﬂation rate,whether 0% or 4%,they could factor it into their
decisions,and arrange loans that made everyone better off.It’s only after the
inﬂation rate became variable that a nominal loan became risky and the credit
market stopped working as effectively.
We considered how the events in Period 6,with its particularly high inﬂation rate,
resembled the conditions in the United States that led to the Savings and Loan
(S&L) crisis of the 1980s.These S&L banks suffered losses on their mortgage loans
because of unexpectedly high inﬂation.The S&L losses constituted a wealth transfer
to the homeowners who had borrowed from them at ﬁxed nominal rates.Similarly,
Period 3 resembled,on a small scale,the conditions that borrowers in the Great
Depression faced when they lost their businesses,farms and homes due to
unexpectedly low inﬂation.In this case,the borrowers’losses were the lenders’
gains.Either way,the wealth transfer resulted from inﬂation uncertainty.
When asked to describe their decisions in the experiment,students reported that
to avoid potential losses,lenders and borrowers both started asking for more
favorable nominal interest rates on their loans.In fact,they could not always agree
on a nominal interest rate that provided each enough compensation for their risk.
So,some lenders took the safer course of using their funds for their own projects.
Thus,the ﬁnancing for some borrowers’projects dried up and we saw a social cost
from inﬂation uncertainty,as the credit market no longer channelled funds to all
the highest-valued projects.
Finally,we discussed how the experiment helps us understand why the Federal
Reserve strives to maintain a predictable inﬂation rate.The Fed wants to prevent
wealth transfers between borrowers and lenders that can have the devastating
effects we saw during the Great Depression and the S&L crisis.Furthermore,the Fed
wants to ensure that the credit markets can channel funds to the most productive
investment projects,so that society enjoys growth in standards of living.
Six weeks after running the session whose results appear in Table 6,I put these
students in pairs and asked them to take ﬁve minutes at the beginning of class to
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including A and D,negotiated a high enough interest rate in Period 7 to induce
them to forgo the safety of their own projects.Interestingly enough,Lender F
decided to go back to lending in Period 8,even as lending got riskier.Lender F also
lent in Period 9,when lending became riskier yet.In contrast,Lender E stuck with
their own project for the rest of the experiment.Similarly,D sought the safety of
their own project from Period 8 on,and B did so in Period 9.Thus,in Period 9,with B,
D,and E funding their own projects rather than lending to Borrowers 4,6 and 7,
projects with real returns of 1.0%,1.5% and 1.5% displaced projects with real
returns of 3.0%,4.0% and 5.0%.
Period 5 was the one randomly selected to provide payoffs.All of the borrowers
ﬁnanced their projects that period,and with a perfectly predictable inﬂation rate,
no one made any losses.So in addition to their stake of three pieces of chocolate,
the borrowers each received payoffs from their projects,net of their ﬁnancing cost.
For instance,consider Borrower 5.Table 5 shows that they had a 3.5% real return on
their project.They paid a nominal interest rate of 5.5%,which in real terms was
1.5%.The proﬁt from their project was therefore 3.5% – 1.5% = 2.0%.Each 0.5% of
proﬁt generates one piece of chocolate,so Borrower 5 collected seven pieces.The
person who lent to Borrower 5,Lender B,collected six pieces of chocolate,one for
each 0.5% of real interest on the loan,plus the three from the stake.Altogether,this
class collected 112 pieces of chocolate.When using the project values listed in
Table 5,an instructor who brings to class an average of seven pieces of chocolate
per student will have enough to provide the promised payouts,even for a Period
such as 5,where the payouts were maximised because all of the highest-valued
projects were ﬁnanced.
Table 6:Results for an Intermediate Macroeconomics class of 16 students
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Job loss Job loss
Inﬂation 0% 0% 0% 4% 4% 3,4,5% 2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 0,1,2,3,4,
rate 5,6% 5,6,7% 5,6,7,8%
Loans 7A 3.0% 7D 2.5% 7D 2.2% 2A 6.0% 1G 5.5% 5A 6.0% 1A 7.0% 1H 7.0% 8F 6.5%
5F 3.0 4F 2.5 1A 2.0 8D 6.2 2A 5.5 1G 6.0 7G 6.5 2A 6.5 2A 6.5
2G 2.5 5A 2.0 5G 2.25 4H 6.0 5B 5.5 4D 6.0 5C 6.5 5C 6.5 5G 6.5
6D 2.5 2C 2.0 3B 2.5 5C 6.0 6F 5.7 3B 6.1 3B 6.5 3G 6.8 3C 6.8
8H 2.5 1B 2.25 4F 2.3 6E 6.0 4D 5.7 6F 5.9 6D 6.8 8B 6.4 1H 6.5
1B 2.0 6E 2.5 6C 2.2 7F 5.5 8C 5.5 8E 5.9 8H 6.6 6F 6.7
3C 2.5 8H 2.5 8H 2.4 3B 5.5 7H 5.5 2H 6.0
3G 2.5 2E 2.2 1G 5.5 3E 5.7 7C 6.4A Classroom Inflation Uncertainty Experiment
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reference to a supply and demand schedule.How closely did behavior in these
periods match the behavior predicted by economic theory? 
2. Consider the periods when everyone knew there would be an inﬂation rate of
4%.What does theory predict will be the nominal interest rate and quantity of
loans? Explain how you found your answer.How close are the actual results to
the theoretical predictions?
3. How did participants deal with inﬂation uncertainty when it was introduced in
later periods? Did the nominal interest rates and quantity of loans change when
inﬂation uncertainty was added,and as inﬂation uncertainty increased? How
would you describe participants’attitudes toward the risk associated with
inﬂation uncertainty? How would you describe the effects of inﬂation
uncertainty on society in general? In particular,how would you say that inﬂation
uncertainty affected investment in the projects?
Conclusions
This experiment provides concrete and memorable experience with the effects of
anticipated and unanticipated inﬂation.What’s more,the experiment is fun,with
lenders calling out for the inﬂation-determining die to roll low,and borrowers
doing victory dances when the die rolls high.After experiencing the wealth transfer
produced by inﬂation uncertainty and seeing its effect on the credit market,
students understand a central bank’s goal of reducing inﬂation uncertainty.By
demonstrating the importance of keeping inﬂation uncertainty low,the
experiment provides the foundation for future class discussions of how central
banks go about reducing inﬂation uncertainty,for instance by targetting inﬂation.
Appendix:Instructions for the inﬂation uncertainty 
classroom experiment
1. You are about to participate in an experiment involving borrowing and lending.
The experiment will consist of a series of market periods.Each period you have
the opportunity to invest in a productive project that earns the real interest rate
shown on your information slip.Your project’s real interest rate is the amount by
which your purchasing power would increase if you invested in your project.
Different people have projects that yield different real rates.Each project
requires an investment of $100 and may only be undertaken once each period.
Each project is completely over at the end of the period.
2. Your information slip tells you how much money you start each period with.
Some of you start each period with $100.Those of you who have $100 have two
options each period:(1) you may invest your $100 in your own project,or (2) you
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describe what they learned from the inﬂation uncertainty experiment.Some of
their responses to this open-ended writing assignment appear below.
• As range of potential inﬂation rates increased with each round,lenders were
only willing to lend at higher and higher rates due to increase in risk.
• It is important to know or have a good idea about what future inﬂationary
ﬁgures will look like in order to ensure proﬁts from an investment.The inﬂation
rate determines what group,borrowers or lenders,will proﬁt most.
• The experiment showed how inﬂation affected borrowers and loaners
differently,and how when inﬂation is unknown there are greater risks to both
lending and borrowing.So this uncertainty in inﬂation led to lower conﬁdence
and less participation in borrowing and loaning.
• Lots of uncertainty sharply lowered the amount of loans,as more people
invested in their own projects.It really showed how a high level of uncertainty
was detrimental to investment.Low or high levels of inﬂation didn’t seem to
matter as long as it was predictable.The rate in itself had little or no effect.
• Inﬂation uncertainty certainly hampers investment.This is why the Fed is
charged to keep inﬂation rates low and stable,since a low and stable rate makes
investment decisions much easier.
• The higher inﬂation uncertainty is,the more difficult it is to get people to borrow
or lend and make investments.So capital doesn’t get allocated to best projects
and people don’t gain as much as they might have.This experiment really
helped us to understand the inﬂation related concepts that we learned in class.
It also showed the importance the Fed’s job in controlling inﬂation has on the
ability of our economy to maintain higher output.
When I use this experiment in my principles of economics course with an
experimental component,I ask the following questions as part of a laboratory
report assignment.To answer these questions,students need to know the returns
on all the projects,as well as the experimental results.So,as part of the follow-up
assignment,the instructor gives students the equivalent of Tables 5 and 6.
Laboratory report questions
1. Consider the periods when everyone knew there would be no inﬂation.Given
the real interest rates on participants’projects,what does economic theory
predict will be the nominal interest rate and quantity of loans? Explain,with
reference to either the theoretical supply and demand curves for funds,or withA Classroom Inflation Uncertainty Experiment
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four columns,depending on what you did that period.Do not try to ﬁll in more
than one of the last four columns in each period.
8. You will collect your proﬁts from the experiment in the form of chocolate.
Everyone will start with three pieces.At the end of the experiment,I will roll a die
to determine which one period will provide you with experimental proﬁts.For
each 0.5% proﬁt that you earned that period,I will give you one additional piece
of chocolate.If you earned a loss that period,then each 0.5% of your loss will
reduce your chocolate by one piece.
Notes
* The author gratefully acknowledges Jeffrey Parker’s help designing the inﬂation
uncertainty experiment,and the funding provided by a grant from Will and Susanna
Thomas and from the Sally Ann Abshire Research Scholar Award.She also thanks
Noelwah Netusil for her helpful suggestions.
1 Note that the experiment does not ask students to record their economic proﬁt.
However,the instructor could choose to have students do so.The ‘if you lent’column
in the record-keeping sheet would then would have the real interest rate earned on
the loan,minus the real interest rate on the student's project.Also,the student who
funds his own project would have a proﬁt equal to the interest rate on his project
minus the opportunity cost of funds.The opportunity cost of the funds would be the
real interest rate he could have earned,which is different every period.So,to make this
proﬁt calculation,we need to take the average of the real interest rates that period,
and subtract this opportunity cost of funds from the real interest rate on the student's
project.Similarly,those who did not borrow and have no funds would have a loss
equal to the opportunity cost of their forgone proﬁts (the real interest rate on their
project minus the average real interest rate paid that period).The author understands
that there are pedagogical beneﬁts to this careful attention to measuring and
recording opportunity cost.However,when she had students record economic proﬁt,
she found it made the experiment as a whole difficult enough for some students to
understand that about one-third got confused and frustrated,and ended up behaving
randomly.The author therefore simpliﬁed the proﬁt recording so that students could
focus on the main points of the experiment.Fortunately,whether students record
their proﬁts as economic or accounting does not affect their incentives.
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may lend your $100 to someone else who will invest it in their project.The rest
of you start each period with no funds,though you can ﬁnance your project by
borrowing $100 from someone else.Regardless of what you do in a particular
period,you will start the subsequent period with the funds (either $100 or zero)
speciﬁed on your information slip,and nothing else.That is,each market period
is completely separate from the others.Nothing you’ve done in the past carries
over into the current period.
3. You may borrow or lend only once in each period,but you may also choose not
to borrow or lend.Borrowers and lenders will contract for loans in terms of a
nominal interest rate.The nominal interest rate speciﬁes how many dollars will
be repaid as a percentage of the $100 borrowed.The market institution is the
double oral auction.Borrowers and lenders will mingle,calling out offers such as,
‘I’ll borrow at 2.6%,’or ‘I’ll lend at 8.75%’.All loans must be for exactly $100.
4. Once you have agreed upon a loan,come to the front of the room and report
the interest rate and the IDs of the borrower and lender.I will post this
information on the board for everyone to see.Once everyone who wishes to has
entered into a contract,the loan market closes.After the loan market closes,you
will ﬁnd out what the inﬂation rate has been over that period.For the ﬁrst few
periods,there will be no inﬂation.In subsequent periods,I will roll a die to
determine the inﬂation rate for that period.At the beginning of every period,I
will announce whether there will be inﬂation that period and,if so,how the die
roll will determine the inﬂation rate.
5. Your goal is to maximise your proﬁts.Consider ﬁrst those of you who start with
$100 each period.If you lend,then your proﬁts are the real interest rate you earned
on the loan.You should lend only if you would earn a higher real interest rate from
the loan than your project provides.Otherwise,you should invest in your own
project,thereby earning proﬁts equal to the real interest rate on your project.
6. Consider now those of you who start each period with no funds.If you borrow,
then your proﬁts are the real interest rate you earned on your project minus the
real interest rate you paid for your loan.You should borrow only if your project
provides a higher real interest rate than you would pay on your loan.Otherwise,
you should do nothing,thereby earning proﬁts of zero.Because you must
contract in nominal terms,you will have to subtract the inﬂation rate from the
nominal interest rate in order to calculate the real interest rate on your loan.
7. Please keep track of your actions on your record-keeping sheet.For each period,
record your own ID letter or number in the borrower or lender column,
depending on your actions that period.In the other column,record the ID of the
person with whom you contracted.Record the nominal interest rate of your
loan,the inﬂation rate,and the real interest rate on your loan.If you did not
borrow or lend,leave all these spaces blank.Next,calculate and record your
proﬁts for that period.Note that you will record your proﬁts in one of the last